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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest in workplace democracy and producer's cooperatives is on 
the rise in America, and has been for the past decade. Worker ownership 
and control is seen as possible not just by theoreticians, but by work-
ers themselves. This is not unique in American history, as it occurred 
before collective bargaining became the primary approach of unions. 
This era of "reform unionism" ended when the cooperative firms they 
formed failed. These attempts at "cooperation," like all such attempts, 
demonstrated the susceptibility of cooperatives to trends of degenera-
tion, under-capitalization, lack of institutional support, and, there-
fore, failure. Why, then, the rise in interest? It is due, I think, to 
two things. The first is need, as the deindustrialization process has 
put firms, which may even be profitable, out of business. To save jobs 
workers look for an alternative. The second reason is the remarkable 
success of the system of cooperatives centered in Mondragon in the Bas-
que region of Spain. 
In spite of the increased attention, however, there has been a 
lack of clarity in the way the issues have been discussed. This is due 
in part to theoretical confusion. But, further, while there have been 
general analyses, there has been little work in comparing actual 
attempts to better understand the dynamics of these organizations. In 
order to redress this situation it is necessary to draw out from the 
literature on worker ownership and control some general concepts and 
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organizational principles. This framework can then be used to analyze 
the Iron Molders' cooperative attempts in the 1860's and the Mondragon 
cooperatives of post-World War Two. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
11 , II II k 1 d II In cooperative or war p ace emocracy attempts, measures of 
success go beyond simply the technical capacity to produce at a profit. 
A strong emphasis is placed on equality and democratic ideals. This 
does not mean that the interests of capital are not important; rather, 
the interests of labor are assumed to be prior. The result, theoreti-
cally, is that considerations of success are based in the "democratiza-
tion" of both control and ownership. This means that the social organi-
zation of the firm needs to be democratic, and that the control and 
distribution of the surplus needs to be equitable. (Raymond Russell, 
1985: 21). For workplace democracy, the ideal is for workers to col-
lectively own the workplace, as well as to collectively control the 
work process. It is this combination, in fact, that Russell identifies 
as "democracy in the workplace." In this section I will review the the-
oretical literature on worker cooperatives and try and identify those 
factors which appear most important for success. 
Social Organization 
The most significant feature of social organization is that the 
production process should be organized for the good of everyone in the 
firm, both individually and collectively. In other words such firms 
need to seen as communities, since the main purpose of each firm, 
according to Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, is the "maximization of 
3 
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community well-being. This includes fair income for those who work in 
the enterprise and workers' control of their own work, within jobs as 
personally rewarding as possible" (1982: 7). In attempting to achieve 
this ideal, perhaps no other principle is so necessary for success as 
the one worker/one vote rule, which gives workers citizenship rights in 
the firm. This method of decision-making is preferred is preferred to 
systems which give votes to workers as share-holders which seems inevi-
tably to lead to degeneration of the democratic ideals as the interests 
of capital take precedence over labor. The attempt, then, is to set up 
an organizational social structure which prevents such degeneration from 
occurring. 
In traditional work systems the integrity of work for the majority 
of workers has been broken down through various forms of "scientific 
management," resulting in a controlling elite minority and an alienated 
majority who never take part in, or even see, the work process as a 
whole. The goal of the worker democracy movement is to equalize this 
relationship, so that all workers can know and take part in the whole 
production process. This requires a reconceptualization of property 
rights and control rights in the organization. Instead of an owner, or 
in the case of the corporation a group of owners, having full rights of 
use, rights over the fruits, and rights of abuse (Russell, 1985: 2), 
such rights need to be held by workers as members or citizens, not as 
owners. David Ellerman, for example, argues for the necessity of chang-
ing the corporate structure by separating the book value of the firm 
(e.g. stock ownership) from membership rights (Ellerman, 1982: 312). 
The point is to transform membership rights into personal, as opposed to 
property rights. 
5 
This reconceptualization of workers as members with citizenship 
rights is recognized by Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld who state this 
explicitly: "The main purpose of each firm is not the maximization of 
profit, but the maximization of community well-being. This inc 1 udes 
fair income for those who work in the enterprise and workers' control of 
their own work, with jobs as personally rewarding as possible" (1982: 
7). Rothschild-Whitt stresses this again in stating that "Collective 
organizations ... strive toward the ideal of community. Relationships 
are to be holistic, affective, and of value in themselves" (Rothschild-
Whitt, 1982: 30). However, these notions of industrial democracy, 
worker citizenship, and social ownership, that is, of workplace commu-
nity, are not simply ideals with no basis in organization. Theorists 
have developed forms and means to try to realize these ideals. 
One way to increase the possibility of this kind of organizations 
success is to develop a democratic consciousness through education. As 
Whyte and Blasi point out, "Organizational leaders must develop and 
articulate an ideology that both justifies the form of organization and 
guides its development. They must develop the organizational mission 
beyond simply producing goods and services and providing jobs for its 
members" (Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 402). This involves developing a dif-
ferent way of thinking about ones role in the organization and about the 
purpose of the organization itself. As Bernstein states, there are 
"particular attitudes and values supportive of, and necessary for, 
effective participation by workers and managers in the joint running of 
the enterprise" (Bernstein, 1982: 69). These attitudes include flexi-
bility, compromise, receptivity to others, and acknowledgement of lim-
its; the kind of things one would expect when a group is attempting to 
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cooperate, as relative equals, to get the job done. 
It may be impractical to take democratic control to an extreme, 
and say that everyone must have a say in all decisions, and must have 
equality of roles within the firm. However, even if one allows for 
flexibility in how democratic decision-making takes place, when the 
whole community is involved in decision-making--when electing managers 
for example--voting should be on a one worker/one vote basis, rather 
than on the basis of numbers of shares owned (see Ellerman, 1982: 301; 
Lindenfeld, 1982: 348). It is equally important that voting and deci-
sion-making should take place on a face-to-face basis (Rothschild-Whitt, 
1982: 28). While this can be a cause of strain, and inhibit the success 
of the firm due to conflicts and personality clash, as well as reduce 
involvement due to shyness or lack of interest, its value according to, 
the firms ideals makes it necessary (Mansbridge, 1982). 
One useful mechanism for encouraging the development of such con-
sciousness is to limit hierarchical differences within the organization. 
- This may involve limiting pay differentials, or it may mean the total 
-elimination of a worker/management distinction or at least role rotation 
(see Schlesinger and Bart, 1982: 142, and Johnson and Whyte, 1982: 180). 
For the idealistic forms of workplace democracy, the choice would be 
both collective organization and collective control. While the extreme 
is not necessary for the operation of relatively democratic structures, 
it does seem necessary to limit the distance betweem top and bottom in 
order to accomplish the desired sense of democracy. The goal, here, is--
to allow workers as a group to increase their influence in the direc- -
tion of the firm, and thus decrease the alienation inherent in the_. 
"scientifically managed" firm. 
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If one accepts the continuation of a distinction between worker 
and manager, which may occur given the allowance for relative equality, 
workers must be allowed access to management level information. This is 
necessary so that they can make informed decisions in their role at the 
top of the hierarchy as members in the firm. In this capacity workers 
direct the firm as a group, and initiate policy directions, which would 
not be possible without such information. (see Bernstein, 1982: 62; 
Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 403). Without such access, the the distinction-
may work to dichotomize members and thus violate the social ideals of -
the firm. 
Other means for facilitating workplace democracy include the min-
imization of rule use (Rothschild-Whitt, 1982: 27-28), an independent 
judiciary to mediate disputes between parties within the firm, allowing 
workers to feel free to disagree with management without getting fired 
(Bernstein, 1982: 67), and having the leadership which is willing to 
encourage and works to build a democratic institution (Lindenfeld, 1982: 
345). 
Economic Organization 
As important as the ideal of social organization is the ideal of 
an equitible distribution of the surplus or profit that the firm pro-
duces. Here it is generally thought that the members should share in 
the surplus the firm produces after meeting set costs of production. 
How this is distributed varies from firm to firm, from equal division 
among all members, to distribution based on hours worked, to a wage-
scale basis, and finally--and this is the least desirable option in 
terms of workplace democracy ideals - -according to the proportion of 
stocks owned (see Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 
and Whyte, 1982: 184; and Bernstein, 1982: 73-76). 
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While the actual form that social ownership takes may vary, the 
idea behind it is the same. Instead of ownership by an individual or a 
small group of individuals, who may or may not be working within the 
firm, ownership should be in the hands of the members of the firm, or to 
a limited extent, those with a particular interest in the firm such as 
members of the local community. This may mean simply that the means of 
production should be socially owned and kept in a trust (Rothschild-
Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 7). One of the reasons for doing so is to 
increase workers' interest in the success of the firm. However, the 
actual benefits from making this change alone may be limited. As Ham-
mer, et. al. state, "Changing ownership alone has had some effect on 
organizational committment and felt ownership in the firm. It may also 
reduce alienation from work, but it is not associated with higher levels 
of job satisfaction, feelings of control, or benefit from ownership 
itself" (1982: 106). This means that the actual form ownership takes 
may not significantly alter attitudes, but it is clear that certain 
forms of ownership are more consistent with the ideals than others. 
This has led some to question the importance of individual owner-
ship itself in providing a significant answer to workplace problems. 
Bernstein, for example, states that ownership is not absolutely neces-
sary for democratization, since the rights of membership are more impor-
tant than those of ownership (Bernstein, 1982: 76; Whyte and Blasi, 
1984: 401). Raymond Russell uses the case of Yugoslavia to demonstrate 
this fact. There the industry is socially owned, but the exact meaning 
and organization of this ownership is not precisely defined. This case 
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demonstrates that the important point is the social organization and 
control of the firm, not individual ownership (Russell, 1985: 43). The 
result is collective ownership in which workers are owners by virtue of 
their being citizens or members in the firm. The primary issue in 
social ownership then, seems to be transform the capitalistic notions of 
property rights into a social or collective ownership.This reduces the 
possibility of degeneration given employee stock ownership plans, which 
tend to revert into joint-stock capitalist-looking firms. This collec-
tive ownership form is preferred according to the firms ideals, and is 
consistent with the citizenship ideals of social organization. Workkers 
become citizens of the firm, and as such could be said to "own" a share 
in the firm as members, not as individualistic owners. 
The consequence of this collective ownership is the relatively 
equal distribution of the surplus that is produced by the firm. It is 
in this way that the social organization of the firm pays off economi-
cal ly for the members. This benefit should be seperated from wages, 
which should be calculated at a fair rate, as this share is interest on 
labor, not capital. This seperation of wages and shares is consistent 
with the ideals of the firm in which membership is valued apart from 
ownership or production. This distinguishes these firms from the typi-
cal corporation which pays out the surplus on the basis of ownership. 
In addition to interest on labor and wages (which should be con-
sidered as an operating cost as is raw materials costs not as an aspect 
of surplus distribution), these firms must also provide for the capital 
needs of the firm. Under-capitalization is a serious problem for these 
firms, and if the surplus is paid out without regard to the necessity of 
working capital and development capital, the firm will fail. The problem 
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of insufficient capital seems to be the primary cause of failure for 
producer cooperatives. If the workers reward themselves too much as 
owners, they will go bankrupt. As such it is essential that a propor-
tion of the surplus be paid to a working capital or capital reserve 
fund. 
Auxiliary Support Institutions 
This leads to the third area which must be addressed: the need 
for auxiliary support institutions. These become particularly important 
if the cooperative attempts to operate in a "hostile" environment. In 
such a case, the firms do not get the same institutional support as an 
ordinary firm, and thus need to develop their own institutions. These 
may include social security, education, legal and political organiza-
tions, research and development firms, etc. But, none is as important 
as the financial institution. Cooperatives are prone to under-capitali-
zation due in part to unwillingness of capitalist lending institutions 
to provide support, hence they need to develop their own support system. 
One solution is to develop an internal banking system in which the 
worker is credited with his portion of the surplus but which is kept by 
the firm to provide capital, and which the worker can obtain only by 
leaving the firm. 
In addition to this more pragmatic consideration, the ideals of 
these firms also suggest that labor should hire capital rather than vice 
versa (Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 7). But, for this to be 
possible, there must be places from which labor can obtain capital. 
Given the reluctance of private banks to lend this capital, the develop-
ment of worker created banking institutions may be the best solution. 
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Along with the bank, it may be necessry for these firms to develop 
other auxiliary institutions. These may include: education, legal sup-
port, political support, research and development, etc. Sirianni, for 
example, suggests the importance of labor market boards and nationally 
administered sabbatical programs (Sirianni, 1984: 498), and Whyte and 
Blasi state, "We see the necessity for building a regional and national 
organizational infrastructure to provide information, action research, 
and technical assistance to worker owned firms" (1984: 404). The sup-
port of such an infrastructure with its auxiliary institutions seems 
necessary for the firms survival, as these firms do not receive support 
from the existing structures which perceive them as bad risks, as under-
cutting the system, as threats to the American way, etc. 
Problems 
These firms, then, have a certain democratic ideal toward which 
they aim. They need to develop a social organization in keeping with 
this ideal, as well as set up a means of distributing the material sur-
plus of the firm. However, just because they set up an organization 
which approximates their ideals does not mean they will automatically 
succeed. As Frank Lindenfeld states, "A caution: workers' cooperatives 
are not a panacea. Like other businesses, they need capital management, 
adequate capital, and good marketing" (Lindenfeld, 1982: 351). What 
this means is that ideology and good organization alone will not ensure 
success. These firms must be able to produce at least enough profit to 
refinance themselves, even if there is no surplus beyond wages for the 
workers to share (A note here regarding fixing prices, it may be possi-
ble for these firms to undercut prices of other firms, and sacrifice 
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their sharing of profit for a larger share of the market, but this may, 
as the Iron Molders will demonstrate, be a short-lived benefit, as capi-
talists have-more resources, and are likely to win the war). 
In addition to the problem of capital financing, there are other 
real barriers which must be addressed. Given that some measure of 
democracy is desired, the issues of time and efficiency become impor-
tant. There is only so much time in the day, and workers have interests 
outside the workplace, so they don't have time to sit in all meetings 
and participate in all the firms decisions (Rothschild-Whitt, 1982: 
38-39). It may also be difficult for such meetings to be meaningful if 
the firm is too large, and representative democracy may be necessary 
(Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 9). There are also the Weberian 
problems of institutionalization or bureaucratization, and oligarchiza-
tion. Quite often the tendency of these firms is to degenerate into the 
kind of firms they reject (Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld, 1982: 11-13; 
Johnson and Whyte, 1982: 195; and Sirianni, 1984: 500). 
Possibilities 
While these are real problems which must be addressed, it does not 
mean that there is no hope for producer cooperation. It is possible to 
learn from the attempts of the past, and make the necessary adjustments. 
This may mean compromise is necessary. Sirianni, in particular, 
stresses the necessity of flexibility and of a pluralistic approach 
rather than strictly abiding to the holistic or productive integrity 
model which takes equality to its full extent (Sirianni, 1984: 486). 
While recognizing the reality of these limits, he does not make the mis-
take of going to the pessimistic extreme. He feels that these real 
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problems can be faced with relative success. He states, "Oligarchy, 
persistent as it may be, is not wrought of iron" (Sirianni, 1984: 500). 
The goal of relatively equal organizations, both in terms of ownership 
and control, may be achieved. While there is no one best way for these 
to organize, there are general areas of workplace organization which can 
guide firms in clarifying what it is they want to achieve. To better 
understand what specifics may work in particular situations, it is use-
ful to look at actual attempts and, even if they were failures, draw 
from these the principles of organizational success for the future. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IRON MOLDERS 
This theoretical framework can guide the study of an actual 
attempt to institute such ideals. This is an attempt, by the Iron Mold-
er's Union, to develop a system of "Cooperation" in the iron industry in 
the late 1860's. But, before looking at this directly it will be help-
ful to set the historical stage to better understand what resources the 
Molders had available to make such an attempt. This also helps to 
understand why their attempt took the form of cooperation. 
Historical Setting 
The era in which the molders attempted cooperation was perhaps the 
most rapidly changing era in American history. In the last half of the 
nineteenth century, "A society of small, owner-operated workshops and 
factories dependent upon the skilled artisan evolved into a system of 
mass-production, utilizing large numbers of unskilled laborers and domi-
nated by huge trusts under the control of finance capitalism" (Derber, 
1970:29). Contrary to what may be presented in some of the sociological 
literature, this change was not simply a smooth transition in which the 
monopoly capitalist readily assumed a place of prominence, either with 
the full support of workers, or due to the workers' lack of resources to 
prevent such a transition. Instead it was an era of conflict and resis-
tance, particularly on the part of skilled artisans who relied on the 
traditionalistic ethic and skilled knowledge for resources of resis-
14 
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tance. 
This reaction has been studied by Herbert Gutman who emphasizes 
the importance of looking at actual workers' response within communi-
ties, rather than relying on broad historical reactions. Of the period 
from 1843-1893 Gutman writes that there existed "a profound tension 
between the older American pre-industrial social-structure and the mod-
ernizing institutions that accompanied the development of industrial 
capitalism" (Gutman, 1977a: 13). During this time there was a radical 
industrial transformation throughout the country, and the skilled 
craftsmen seem most susceptible to the negative affects of this on their 
trade. The reactions against this process were rooted in the community 
ties and the ties within the trades themselves. As Gutman says, "Gilded 
Age artisans did not easily shed stubborn and time honored work-habits" 
(Gutman, 1977a: 36). These workers were able to draw support from their 
artisan work-habits, and their working class community subculture to 
resist threats to their trade. This was possible since the capitalists 
they were resisting tended to come from outside the community and had 
not yet established social status commensurate with their economic posi-
tion. As Gutman states, "Economic power was not easily translated into 
social and political power, and the changes resulting from rapid indus-
trialization stimulated sufficient opposition to the industrialist to 
deprive him of the status and the authority he sought and needed" (Gut-
man, 1977d: 258). 
At least at the beginning of this era of transition, then, workers 
had important resources available for resistance. They were able to 
draw on community support in their struggles against real and perceived 
threats from the capitalists. They could utilize the fact of their 
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skill-knowledge necessary to production in these pre-automation days, 
and could actually, in certain cases, start their own firms (Gutman, 
1977c). This ability to utilize their resources to begin their own 
firms may not always have been in response to the threat of capitalists, 
but it did serve as a ray of hope in times of strikes, lockouts, etc. 
From Gutman's perspective, then, it is clear that this time in history 
was not simply a time for despair for the skilled tradesman, it was a 
time of action, response, and perhaps of hope that workers could fight 
back against the system using skills and traditionalistic, community 
ideals. It is this structure, in which workers were able to mobilize 
their power, that the workers were trying to defend. Based on a value-
system with a rich American heritage, they fought against its direct 
opposite leading to the "Europeanisation" of America, and the "serfdom" 
of all workers (Gutman, 1977a: 52-54). 
David Montgomery also addresses skilled workers response to the 
threats to their trades in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury. He finds that it was possible for workers to resist because of 
their knowledge over the production process, their moral code which gov-
erned behavior on the job, and which emphasized mutuality and the col-
lective good (Montgomery, 1983: 391). This combination proved very 
important for these skilled workers, as "technical knowledge acquired on 
the job was embedded in a mutualistic ethical code, also required on the 
job, and together these provided skilled workers with considerable pow-
ers of resistance to the wishes of their employers" (Montgomery, 1979: 
14). One of the ways these resources were maintained was through the 
use of the "stint," which was an output quota fixed by the workers and 
not to be exceeded by any individual worker. The argument for this was 
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that "unlimited output led to slashed price rates, irregular employment, 
drink and debauchery. Rationally restricted output, however, 
reflected 'unselfish brotherhood,' personal dignity, and 'cultivation of 
the mind.'" This led to the development of wh,.at Montgomery calls a 
"manly" bearing toward one's boss (which meant the worker held his 
ground and did not flinch before the boss's authority), as well as the 
development of manliness toward ones fellow workers (which primarily 
meant not undermining or undercutting each others right to work by doing 
more than one job's worth of work) (Montgomery, 1979: 13). So, Montgom-
ery, too, argues that skilled workers in this period, particularly in 
smaller towns, were not without resources to resist the threats to their 
jobs. They were able to draw on the traditions within their craft and 
their community, as well as on their skills, to put up a fight; fights 
ranged from negotiations, to strikes, to total breaks with the "capital-
ist" firm and starting their own firms. 
This traditionalistic ethic proved particularly important in 
determining the direction the labor movement would take. The two pri-
mary options were reform unionism which was built on the ideals of the 
traditonalistic consciousness, and trade unionism based on collective 
bargaining, which was still in its infancy. As Gerald Grob states, 
reform unionism was based 
on a vision of past society where the independent artisan combined 
in his own person both employer and employee functions. . The 
only legitimate division that they recognized was between the pro-
ducing and the non-producing class, the former being given the stamp 
of legitimacy and the latter marked for obliteration. The end objec-
tive of reform unionism was the creation of a society where all 
would belong to the producing class, and the individual would com-
bine in his own person both worker and employer functions (Grob, 
1961: 7). 
The most obvious means of achieving the elimination of the non-producing 
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class and the need for capital, given their traditionalistic ideals, was 
"cooperation." As Selig Perlman states, "To the American worker, who 
hankered to be rid of the capitalist 'boss,' a cooperative self-bossing 
seemed almost as desirable as self-employment as an independent individ-
ual" (Perlman, 1949: 190). Cooperation, then, came to be seen as the 
means by which the workers could force the capitalists' hand by beating 
them at their own game, while maintaining the traditionalistic ideology 
intact, building on the American ideals of individualism and free-enter-
prise (Derber, 1970: 190). It was seen as a means of eliminating the 
wage-system, with its inherent tension between worker wages and capital-
ist profits (Grob, 1961: 15). The primary advocate of such a system of 
cooperation was the leader of the Iron Molders, William H. Sylvis, "the 
first great figure in the American labor movement" (Andrews, 1966: 7). 
The Union and Cooperation 
The Iron Molders Union was one of the earliest unions to make sig-
nificant and lasting attempts at forming a national union. The earliest 
attempts were typically local, and were directed primarily toward wage-
cuts and abuses of the apprenticeship/helper system on the part of the 
capitalists. These arose only during lean years, and tended to disap-
pear when the economy improved. The economic depression of 1857 brought 
particularly bad conditions to the Molders, leading to wage reductions, 
strict work rules concerning contracts, helpers, tools, etc., on a 
nationwide scale. Local unions had little success in fighting back, 
particularly given the rise of employer combinations, so it became 
increasingly clear that a wider base of operation was needed. With Wil-
liam Sylvis leading the way, the Molders held their first national con-
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vention in Philadelphia on July 5, 1859. This union increased steadily 
in size, with forty-four locals represented at the 1861 national conven-
tion, but then the Civil War, which sent many of the leaders to the 
front, including Sylvis, almost resulted in the end of the union. At 
the 1863 convention, only fourteen locals were represented. After being 
elected president, Sylvis was sent on a famous organizational trip to 
revive the union. The trip was a great success, as was Sylvis' presi-
dency, and the union grew quite strong (for a full history see Stockton, 
1922). 
The union that Sylvis was instrumental in organizing was built on 
the tradional values and skills of the workers. Daniel Walkowitz points 
this out for the iron workers in Troy and Cohoes, NY: "Industrial work-
ers settled into Troy and Cohoes, and established kinship groups in eth-
nic working-class neighborhoods. The church and other institutions 
facilitated the development of a supportive associational network. 
These institutions helped the workers adapt in the city and were impor-
tant preconditions for protest" (Walkowitz, 1978: 137). In addition to 
this community support, there was also support within the trade itself. 
As Montgomery found for other trades, the Molders made use of 
stints and the workman's ethic. The stint as a means of controlling 
output levels had a long tradition among the Iron Molders (Stockton, 
1968: 156). Molders battled fiercely over maintaining lower levels for 
this quota, so as to resist over-production which threatened fellow 
molders' jobs, as well as their own in the long run. The workman's 
ethic judged those who worked beyond the quotas as selfish and inhuman. 
In fact, Stockton indicates that "one of the earliest rules of the Mold-
ers Union provided that no member should endanger the job of another 
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member by working at a lower rate of pay or even offering to do so" 
(Stockton, 1968: 137). Sylvis himself states, "We hold it to be ingen-
erous, if not inhuman, for half a dozen men to transcend their physical 
abilities by working late and early, to monopolize all the work in the 
shop"; and again, "to retain the power of self-protection, we must be a 
unit in heart and purpose, tolerating no innovation which secures a ben-
efit to one at the expense of another" (Stockton, 1968: 434, 435). 
This support of each other went beyond the organization and rules of the 
workplace, and included support in sympathetic strikes as well. For 
example, in Troy, NY, when 745 Molders were locked out, 750 iron workers 
walked out in support (Walkowitz, 1978: 
160). 
96; see also Ozanne, 1963: 
In addition to this strength drawn from traditional ideals and 
community support, the Molders clearly benefited from the fact that 
their skills were essential to the production of iron, and as long as 
they maintained solidarity they could resist the threats to their craft 
with a high degree of success. The importance of their skills to pro-
duction may have led the Molders on to their next stage of union devel-
opment, the push for cooperation. 
Drawing on the past for a vision of the good society, and resting 
secure in the irreplaceability of their skills, the Molders attacked. 
Through cooperation they hoped to set up the beginning of the end for 
the non-producing class, and to eliminate the wage/capital division by 
investing both in one person, the worker/owner. Milton Derber outlines 
the ideals of the producer cooperatives as they existed in theory. The 
cooperative 
was intended to eliminate the profit-maker and to be run on the 
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principles of direct democracy by the owner producers. Each worker 
would have a single vote; the management would be selected by the 
workers; and major policies would be determined by group discussion 
and decision. All workers would be co-owners so that the employer 
employee relationship and the wages system operating within that 
relationship would be eliminated. Outsiders would have no voice in 
the government of the enterprise (Derber, 1970: 38-39). 
While these goals may ultimately have been beyond reach, at this stage 
they were seen as a realisable. Trade unionism was seen ultimately as 
contrary to achieving this ideal, serving instead as a necessary first 
step that needed to be surpassed. After addressing trade unionism as 
important for organizing the movement, Sylvis stated, "'Cooperation' is 
the next great step; this taken, and we will have crossed the boundry 
which has so long seperated man from his destiny .. By cooperation, 
we will become a nation of employers--the employers of our own labor" 
(Sylvis, 1968: 168). At the labor congress of the National Labor Union, 
of which Sylvis was also president, cooperation was presented as a "sure 
and lasting remedy for the abuses of the present industrial system, and 
that until the laws of the nation can be remodeled so as to recognise 
the rights of men instead of classes. The system of cooperation care-
fully guarded will do much to lessen the evils of our present system" 
(Andrews, 1966: 118-119). The hopes for cooperation, then, were quite 
high. It was the means of ushering in the new society based on old 
ideals, or put another way, ushering out the new, "corrupt" modern sys-
tern. 
What the workers wanted most was to secure the full fruits of 
their labor, which meant for them the elimination of the wage system. 
With their traditionalistic community ideals, these molders perceived 
owners as denying workers their full share of the surplus. As Andrews 
states, the cooperatives "were the efforts of workingmen to carry on 
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their own as a form of productive cooperation which would give them the 
whole product of their labor" (Andrews, 1966: 111). Sylvis himself 
contended that "Labor is the real source of all wealth" (Sylvis, 1968: 
98). This desire of labor to retain the full value of their labor was a 
rooted in the earlier days of the semi-autonomous, non-factory craft 
production. Sylvis was most adament on this need to eliminate wages: 
For years I have been teaching the doctrine, that under the system 
of paying wages to labor and profits to capital, there never was nor 
never could be any identity of interest between employers and 
employed. Both were activated by the same principle--to buy in the 
cheapest and sell in the dearest market. The result could be noth-
ing but antagonism (Sylvis, 1968: 390). 
The solution to the inherent tension was to be cooperation which joined 
worker and owner. Cooperation was the "only way by which we can hope to 
control the two elements of capital, labor and money, and take from the 
few who arrogate to themselves the right to own the one and control the 
other, the power they have ever employed to subjugate and degrade labor" 
(Stockton, 1931: 262). The system of wages, then, was very significant 
in the selection of cooperation as the option to be pursued. Rather 
than accomodate, the workers sought to assert their authority which they 
thought was sufficient given their ideology and their skills. 
This abhorence of the wages system actually led molders to reject 
trade unionism as an option, as Norman Ware indicates: "The reluctance 
of the labor movement to accept collective bargaining as its major func-
tion was due largely to the fact that this involved an acceptance of the 
wage system." Given this, the best option was the producers' coopera-
tive (Ware, 1959: 320). Others would later declare that this pursuit 
actually hindered the progress of the labor movement by denying its only 
true resource (Perlman, 1949; Commons, 1966). However, at the time 
23 
reform unionism seemed the best option, and, for perhaps the only time 
on a significant scale, it dominated trade unionism. However, it would 
not last, and by the end of the century trade unionism would reign 
supreme (Grob, 1961: 10). To better understand why cooperation was 
attempted, what it looked like , and why it failed, it will be helpful 
to look at attempts at Troy, NY and Pittsburgh, PA, the two most signif-
icant cooperative ventures by the Molders. 
The Troy Cooperative 
After calling for cooperation for years, the Iron Molders saw it 
first attempted by the local iron molders of Troy, NY. In Troy the 
molders and the community as a whole had a shared value system which 
drew upon communitarian, traditionalistic values. Troy, and the iron 
workers in particular, was dominated by immigrants, particularly the 
Irish. In 1860, for instance, fifty-nine percent of Troy's citizens 
were foreign-born or the son or daughter of an immigrant, and among the 
molders, fifty-five per cent were Irish (Walkowitz, 1974: 442, 437). 
This proved to be important in the establishment of community ties and 
values, as workers could build on ethnic ties as well as shared work 
experiences and skills. Walkowitz, who has done several studies of the 
iron workers in Troy, states, "A closer look at certain skilled and uns-
killed Troy workers during this period discloses cohesive family and 
cultural patterns that helped to knit the iron worker community 
together. These patterns may provide clues to the attitudes, values, 
and life-stule that influenced the social behavior of these workers" 
(Walkowitz, 1974: 444; see also p. 459). These ties were significant 
in providing the resources needed to make efforts at resistance and con-
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trol. The molders had the support of the Irish dominated police 
department, as well as the Irish political machine, and as such were 
provided with assurances that their efforts at resistance would not be 
opposed by the local political and legal authorities. Resistance, then, 
provided evidence for solidarity, rather than disintegration as some 
have suggested. As Walkowitz indicates, "Violence and conflict, how-
ever, can reflect a certain integrity and organization within a strong 
community. Household and family structure provide one index of the 
social basis of organization and protest" (1974: 454). Extended 
efforts of resistance--the 1866 molders strike lasted a period of 
months--would not have been possible without this supportive network. 
It was a result of this 1866 strike that the molders established the 
first cooperative foundry which would serve as a ray of hope for molders 
nation-wide, and it is clear that the community solidarity was signifi-
cant in its establishment. 
. While the strike turned out to be a triumph for the molders who 
won and returned to work, it was hoped that its most significant product 
would be the formation of the cooperative foundry. Financed by local 
molders, they hoped it would serve as the model for the future of the 
molding industry. The idea was to set up a foundry which was based on 
the principles of democracy, worker ownership, and worker control. 
While the specifics of the program are not as clear as the later Pitts-
burgh attempt, it is clear that they looked to the Rochdale pioneers for 
guidance. E. W. Bemis does give some idea of the organization at the 
Troy cooperative in terms of ownership and profit distribution: "Out of 
any profits there was to be paid first an interest of 10% on capital, 
and all the rest of the profits were to be divided equally between each 
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stockholder working for the company, without regard to the stock he 
held, though only one vote was given to a member. All the stockholders 
did not work in the foundry" (Stockton, 1931: 272). From these princi-
ples it can be seen that the molders sought, in Russell's terms, to have 
collective ownership and collective control of the foundry. In April 
1866 the Cooperative Stone Works was founded, and by December it was 
already a success. At this time 1132 men were reported at work and were 
said to be earning an average of $30 a week, a sum greatly in excess of 
prevailing wages. While the capitalization amounted only to $30, 000, 
real estate and 'stock' were held to the value of $50,000. From May, 
1866, to January, 1867, the business done aggregated $100,000 11 (Stock-
ton, 1931: 264). It later came to employ over fifty people who 
received, in addition to wages, two dollars per day in cooperative prof-
its. They also had more contracts than they could handle. This success 
excited many other cooperative attempts, the most significant of which 
was in Pittsburgh. 
The Pittsburgh Cooperative 
In 1867 about 150 Pittsburgh molders were involved in a long and 
bitter strike. The word from Troy provided hope of an alternative form 
of resistance. Sylvis in particular jumped on this opportunity and 
argued that the Molders Union as a whole should get involved in owner-
ship through cooperation. The details of the organization at Pittsburgh 
are clearer than at Troy, due in part to more documentation because of 
its national ownership, but there is reason to believe that it drew 
heavily on the principles used at Troy. The plan was described by Syl-
vis in his presidential report to the Toronto session of the Iron Mold-
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ers International Union on July 8, 1868. $100,000 was to be raised in 
capital stock by way of 20,000 shares sold at five dollars each. No 
individual or union was to own more than 400 shares ($2, 000). The 
foundry association at Pittsburgh was not bound to redeem any share of 
its capital stock within two years of the date of subscription, and in 
no case without three months notice. No shareholder was to have more 
than one vote on any question, regardless of the number of shares he 
held. Five percent of the profits was to go into a sinking fund not to 
exceed $10,000, fifteen percent of profits to shareholders in proportion 
to the amount held by each as interest on capital, and the balance to 
shareholders in proportion to the amount of wages received from work in 
the association, as interest on labor. The Pittsburgh union, or indi-
vidual molder, was required to buy at least 500 shares, and no stock 
could be sold or transferred to any person who was not a member of a 
molders' union without consent of the Board of Directors. The plan ini-
tially seemed a good one. It addressed the issue of insufficient capi-
tal by broadening the base of available capital and minimizing the 
amount necessary to invest. And, it addressed the issue of degeneration 
by limiting the benefits of investment on capital and increasing the 
benefits of labor. These seemed to be the two biggest problems faced by 
cooperatives, and if successful, it was expected that cooperatives would 
sweep across the iron industry and all of industrial America as well. 
As it was, new cooperatives continued to spring up in the wake of the 
success at Troy and Pittsburgh. However, the enthusiasm was short-lived 
as both eventually failed as cooperative ventures. 
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Failure 
The direction in which both failed was similar: both quickly 
became capitalist firms degenerating into joint-stock companies. In 
Troy the lack of a substantial return on capital led to changes in the 
organization of the foundry. Wage earners there realized that they 
could benefit best by keeping their profits below 10% as not all stock-
holders worked in the plant. This led those with larger numbers of 
shares and those who did not work in the plant to amend the constitution 
so that each stockholder could vote according to the number of his 
shares. The result was that wages were reduced and profits were divided 
as in a joint-stock company (Stockton, 1931: 272). The notion of paying 
interest on labor disappeared. As capitalists themselves, the wage sys-
tem did not seem so bad after all. As Andrews states, "The cooperators 
quickly adopted the capitalist view. . . That these capitalistic coop-
erators were less eager for leisure to improve body and mind than they 
had been as trade unionists, is apparent" (Andrews, 1966: 54). When 
faced with the prospects of increasing their share in the profits indi-
vidually, even at the expense of other molders, the ideals seemed to 
become less important. The main problem, then, seems to have been the 
demand on the part of the stockholders, even as members, for increased 
return on capital (Walkowitz, 1978: 185), leading to the degeneration of 
the firm from a cooperative venture into a joint-stock company. 
Pittsburgh followed a similar path. The failure here, as in Troy, 
was directly related to the problem of capital: getting it was diffi-
cult, and those who supplied it wanted to profit significantly as a 
result. The International Union gave in to these demands, seemingly 
without much resistance, and drastically changed the way that the sur-
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plus was distributed. Rather than 5% reserve, 15% interest on capital 
and 80~~ interest on labor, the distribution was set up that foundries 
owned by the Molders Union would pay 12% on capital reserves, 12% on 
labor and 76% to be determined by the stockholders (Grossman, 1973: 215; 
Derber, 1970: 38). In commenting on this change Grossman states, "The 
financial structure of these pseudo-coops was such that, regardless of 
the number of owners, self-interest would pervert to private gain any 
benefits that might accrue to labor in a genuine cooperative" (Grossman, 
1973: 216). However, as Grossman indicates, the failures of this 
foundry in its attempt at as a cooperative went beyond just the problem 
of capital and into all areas of organization: "The sins of these coop-
eratives were legion. The ideals of every cooperative champion 
were here violated" (1973: 217). It is possible now to look at the sins 
of the molders in their cooperatives and thus to better understand the 
issues that such ventures must face if they are to be successful. 
The problems that cooperation faced were not specific only to Troy 
and Pittsburgh. All attempted cooperatives faced similar problems, and 
seemingly all failed to meet the challenge. As Stockton says, "The his-
tory of the Molders' experiments can be summed up by stating that all 
cooperative or quasi-cooperative foundries which were established ulti-
mately ended as business failures or else became partnerships or joint-
stock companies" (Stockton, 1931: 269). It is possible to analyze this 
failure in general terms and from this learn about the possibility of 
future cooperative attempts. This analysis of problems can be guided by 
the three theoretical areas identified above. 
In the area of social organization it is clear that the Molders 
were unsuccessful in maintaining the democratic ideals of relative 
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equality. This problem of social equality is associted with degenera-
tion, as may be clear, is closely related to the problem of capital. 
Troy and Pittsburg demonstrate that those who dared to invest capital 
sought greater returns. Even though the one member/one vote policy would 
seem to dictate against it, they were able to change the rules to the 
benefits of capital rather than labor. Why this happened, and why even 
Sylvis did not seem to object, is not entirely clear. It may be that 
the majority of workers thought they could benefit from this system by 
way of stock-ownership. Given the abhorance of the wage system one 
would not expect such a change. Nonetheless, such a change was made and 
the result was the abandonment of the ideals on which the cooperative 
was built. Foner summarizes this process: 
The molders soon discovered that in order to exist in a competitive 
world, co-op foundries had to abandon co-operative principles. 
Stockholders demanded more and more profits, and to meet these 
demands the co-operatives were forced to reduce wages, lengthen 
working hours, and abolish union standards (Foner, 1947: 419). 
While this assessment seems harsh, the evidence from this period does 
not allow for a positive assessment. Again and again the stockholders 
seem seemed to lead to the abandonment of cooperative principles by 
their call for increased profits (Walkowitz, 1978: 185; Grob, 1961: 20; 
Perlman, 1949: 191; and Grossman, 1973: 216). The conclusion of this 
cooperative attempt is always the same: "No shop or factory has been 
able to maintain efficiency where the workers themselves own and operate 
the plant. If the business succeeds, the original workers become manag-
ers and stockholders, employing men in a purely wage capacity, or some 
sort of paternalism is set up such as profit sharing and copartnership" 
(Ware, 1959: 322). 
The second cause of failure also falls under the area of social 
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organization. This involved the cooperators inability to retain manag-
ers or their lack of recognizing the importance of manager's skills in 
the production process. Not surprisingly, there was an inherent tension 
between workers and managers. There was "constant criticism directed 
against the managers of cooperative plants by their associates. Indeed, 
it was perhaps the 'commonest mistake' of the molders not to recognize 
and reward managerial ability" (Stockton, 1931: 274). This resulted in 
the managers abandoning the cooperative firms for greener pastures. 
"Those who possessed the talent {of managerial skill} did not long 
remain in the movement, but left and used their abilities in 
directing their own plants" (Grossman, 1973: 211). It is ironic, but 
not surprising that those who sought to establish an ideal based on 
their skills failed to realize the importance of the skill of the manag-
ers. 
The third cause of failure of these cooperatives, also in the area 
of social organization, which seems surprisingly common to most producer 
cooperatives, was the hiring of non-member workers. This directly con-
tradicts the principle of workers having rights as members in the firm, 
as well as the one member/one vote rule. While this problem does not 
attract much attention in the literature on the molders, there is evi-
dence that it may have been more widespread than suspected. In certain 
foundries it was found that up to one-third of the work-force were non-
stockholders (Stockton, 1931: 271). This clearly grew out of the 
transformation of the laborers into capitalists who sought to maximize 
their profits. Perlman indicates that, as successful cooperatives grew, 
they tended to hire labor rather than extend membership, which undercut 
the ideals and quickened the transition to a joint-stock model. 
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The fourth, and perhaps the most serious, cause of failure was 
under-capitalization. Even though the capital needed to finance these 
ventures was relatively modest compared to other industries, ranging 
from $15,000 to $20,000, this obstacle was nonetheless formidable. 
Grossman states that "the immediate cause of death was acute financial 
malnutrition" (Grossman, 1973: 211). Pittsburgh provides a classic 
example of this as the molders were short of working capital and a cre-
di ter called in a debt, forcing the foundry to sell out to pay the bill 
(Grossman, 1973: 206). Part of the reason for this lack of capital was 
the actual size of these firms. The typical firm attempting a coopera-
tive consisted of thirty to forty workers who simply did not have the 
money necessary to fully support the foundry (Stockton, 1931: 273), and 
banks were unwilling to risk such loans. This issue of raising capital, 
then, is a real problem that must be addressed by producer cooperatives 
(Andrews, 1966: 112). 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that these cooperators 
failed to recognize this problem. In fact, it was one of the major 
problems that they battled against, arguing that the non-producing class 
should not be able to maintain such power and control over the actual 
producers of that surplus. To battle this problem they supported 
"Greenbackism" as a means by which capital would be easier to obtain, 
they looked for state support of cooperative movements and, as seen with 
Pittsburgh, tried to broaden the base from which capital could be 
obtained. Sylvis even suggested the importance of a national coopera-
tive bank and other auxiliary institutions to provide support for coop-
erative efforts including education, home and land associations, and 
building societies (Sylvis, 1968: 200-204). However, these institutions 
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failed to materialize, the political action failed to effect significant 
change, and the distribution of stock to employees outside the firm 
often led to the next cause of failure, degeneration of the firm into a 
joint-stock company. 
The fifth cause of failure, also in the area of economic organiza-
tion, and which may ultimately have turned molders away from coopera-
tion, was the practice of undercutting the prices of other shops. While 
it seemed to these cooperators that such price-cutting was necessary to 
gain access into the market, the effect on other molders was negative in 
terms of wages (Stockton, 1931: 270). The cooperators could accept 
lower wages since they received a proportion of the capital as well, but 
the non-cooperative factories lowered wages to compete. Given this 
practice it is not surprising that cooperative foundries were successful 
initially, but ultimately fell into disfavor with the majority of the 
workers (Commons, 1966: 54, and Perlman, 1949: 191). This was because 
their undercutting was seen as a violation of one of the basic princi-
ples of the workingman's ethic. As such, the cooperative movement which 
was based on this traditional code may actually have worked against what 
it stood for. 
The sixth cause was the failure of the molders to establish auxil-
iary support institutions. While they were aware of the importance of 
such institutions, for various reasons these were never established. 
Given the short period of time in which these firms existed as coopera-
tives it may have been impossible to develop such institutions from 
within, but the lack of their development may have made certain the 
failure. 
The final cause of failure is the conditions under which all of 
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these cooperatives were established. The fact that cooperatives were 
established during times of labor unrest, strikes, lockouts, etc., may 
have contributed to the difficulty they found in achieving success. 
This was due primarily to the inability of unemployed workers to provide 
the necessary capital, and the need of the union to provide striking 
workers with support. Sylvis indicates that at the time the Pittsburgh 
foundry began at least one-half of the molders membership was out of 
work, some of their severest strikes had to be supported, and nearly all 
of the membership was poor. This made the possibilities for capital 
accumulation extremely slim. Related to this, once the decision was 
made to build, was the sense of urgency drove the projects faster than 
intelligent management would have suggested. The result often was poor 
planning. 
In addition to these causes of failure the molders' example demon-
strates at least two important things about what may or may not be 
needed for a successful producer cooperative. The molders example dem-
onstrates that sharing skill knowledge with relative equality is no 
guarantee of success. Those molders who ventured into these cooperative 
attempts were skilled workers, but they failed nonetheless. As such, 
equality of knowledge in the workplace may be a nice ideal, but it is 
obviously not sufficient for the success of a cooperative firm. Hand-
in-hand with this is the fact that the failure of coops is not due to 
increased technology which strips the workers of control over the work 
process, limiting the possibilities for cooperation. In the case of the 
molders, automation was not a factor until at least the 1880 's, well 
after the cooperative attempt had failed (Stockton, 1922: 37). In fact 
it may have been the iron industry's resistance to mechanization, among 
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other things, which later resulted in its downfall and the rise of steel 
(Brody, 1960: 8-9). 
A Reassessment 
The Iron Molders' attempt at cooperation, then, may be said to be 
a complete failure. It failed in its ideals of worker ownership and in 
its ideals of workplace control. Some would later contend that it set 
the labor movement back from achieving control in the only way it could: 
trade unionism. In fact, history's treatment of cooperation has not 
been kind. The movement has been seen as an idealistic attempt to 
retain an increasingly out-moded way of life and word, and it was a mis-
take on the part of workers to resist modernization (Commons, 1966: 
3-4; Perlman, 1949). However, recent attempts at workplace democratiza-
tion have brought about a review of producer cooperatives and a reass-
essment of their ability to succeed. This has included a reanalysis of 
the historical record to better understand under what conditions and 
which organizational structures of producer cooperatives both succeed 
and fail (see Jones and Svejnar, 1982; Conte, 1982; and Jones, 1984). 
In a similar way the case of the molders can be used to better under-
stand the workplace democracy movement's agenda for success and expan-
sion of the literature. 
It is clear that while the basic principles of cooperation may 
have been sound, the methods for encouraging capital and resisting 
degeneration were not sufficient. It seems that one must institute some 
means by which the degeneration process can be prevented. This may 
involve a system of ownership other than stock-ownership, even when 
split off from membership. It is also apparent that ideology alone will 
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not serve this purpose. The ethic of the workers which gave rise to the 
cooperative impulse was in turn undercut by its own creation through the 
undercutting of prices and violation of production quotas. While this 
is not a particularly new conclusion regarding producer cooperatives, it 
is significant in terms of the suggestion of eliminating stock-owner-
ship. There are many who still want to maintain stock-ownership, split-
ting it off from voting rights, but the molders demonstrated that this 
may not be enough. It seems that our conception of the rights over pri-
vate property are too strong, and the methods for prevention of degener-
at ion too weak to allow for this. Continuing stock-ownership sounds 
good in theory, but it seems to not work well in practice. 
The case of the Iron Molders, then, may have been a complete fail-
ure in terms of cooperation at the time, but it can be instructive in 
helping to establish the principles for the success of cooperatives. 
The ideals are in keeping with the ideals of the present-day push for 
workplace democracy, and the basic plan seems to be sound. The fact 
that we can learn from this failure is evident in the success of another 
producer cooperative attempt, Mondragon. The basic principles of organ-
ization are similar in both, but Mondragon has been more successful in 
eliminating the possibility of degeneration. While the case at Mondra-
gon may not be the ideal either, it is a step in the right direction 
from the failure of the Iron Molders; from it we may continue to 
increase the possibility of workplace democracy as a real option for 
American workers. If the Iron Molders' attempt could be revised, it 
would be possible to argue from strong American ideals, as did the Mold-
ers, and avoid accusations of communism, which mark movements for doom 
in the United States, and thus increase the possibility of receptance 
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and success. 
CHAPTER IV 
MONDRAGON 
The failure of the Iron Molders can be compared to the success of 
the group of cooperatives centered around Mondragon, Spain. Here, too, 
the three theoretical areas--social organization, ownership and distri-
bution of surplus, and auxiliary support institutions--provide the 
framework for analyzing the cooperative enterprises. This comparative 
analysis of Mondragon in comparison can help highlight the essential 
organizational features for cooperation. 
History 
"Mondragon", as the system of cooperatives is often called, has 
its roots in a two-year technical school that was founded in Mondragon, 
Spain in 1943 by Jose Maria Arizmendi. Arizmendi was a Catholic priest 
with a social concience whose primary role in the formation of the coop-
eratives was as idea man and as inspiration. In terms of hands on 
effects, he carried out much of the legal research to find an appropri-
ate organizational form within Spanish law. He also provided the essen-
tial aspect of self-criticism on the part of the firm, analyzing 
problems for solutions rather revelling in success (Campbell, et. al., 
1977: 23). The Technical Training School opened with the help of commu-
nity support, and in partial opposition to the town hall and the city's 
primary industrial company, with an enrollment of twenty. In 1948 its 
success led to the founding of the League of Education and Culture which 
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gave legal status to the school and which still is the organization 
behind the educational system. Of the initial graduates of the techni-
cal school, eleven went on to obtain credentials from an established 
engineering school. Five of these returned to Mondragon and with the 
help of Arizmendi decided to set up their own cooperative firm to put 
the ideas learned from Arizmendi into practice. 
In 1956 Ulgor was founded as a limited liability corporation under 
Spanish law. It took two years of legal research to finally reach a 
better legal position, under cooperative law, which was consistent with 
their ideals. To start Ulgor, the five raised eleven million pesatas 
(1980 100 pesata = $1.43 U.S.) from friends, relatives, and the commu-
nity. Their first products were paraffin-fueled space heating stoves. 
They later added a line in electrical parts, and in 1958 started a cast-
ing shop and foundry. In this year they also added butane-fueled cook-
ers and heaters which brought the first assembly-lines, which were seen 
as necessary to compete. In 1959, along with two other cooperatives, 
they recognized the need of a support institution to achieve the goals 
of financial stability and expansion. The result was the Caja Laboral 
Popular (CLP), or Peoples Savings Bank, which began to operate in 1960. 
In addition to providing investment funding, the bank was also to pro-
vide professional expertise for the cooperatives, as well as social 
security benefits. The Contract of Association was developed by the 
CLP, which set the terms which cooperatives must follow to be a part of 
this cooperative network. This included organizational implementation 
of the ideals of social control and equitable surplus distribution. 
In 1966 Alecoop, a cooperative educational foundry, was estab-
lished to provide training and retraining, and was financed by student 
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workers who worked in the foundry five hours and then were in school 
five hours per day. In 1968 Eroski, a consumers cooperative, was formed 
by an amalgamation of already exixting consumer cooperatives. In 1970 
Lagun-Aro was established as a seperate cooperative from the CLP to pro-
vide for social security and health care benefits. In 1974 there was a 
strike in Ulgor, the largest cooperative with over 4,000 workers, and 
the result was a reanalysis of actual worker input. This in turn 
resulted in the institutionalization of creative worker input, gradual 
phasing-out of Tayloristic principles of scientific management, and 
attempts toe limit numbers of workers in cooperatives to about 400. 
From 1978-1980 plans were made, also in response to pressures from 
inside and outside, to group cooperatives into federations so as to take 
advantage of economies of scale while staying true to cooperative ideals 
(Historical information from Thomas and Logan, 1982: 14-38; Eaton, 
1978: 478; Gutierrez-Johnson, 1978: 267; Bradley and Gelb, 1981: 213). 
The cooperative system has grown from the initial 24 workers of 
Ulgor in 1956 to include, in 1984, 165 cooperative organizations, 7 
agro-industrial concerns, 14 building companies, 3 service organiza-
tions, and a system of consumer cooperatives serving 7 5, 000. The CLP 
has 132 branches in the Basque region and $1 billion (U.S.) in assets. 
There were over 18, 000 workers in the various cooperatives, and the 
cooperators made up about 10% of the Guiporcoa region (Gutierrez-John-
son, 1984: 35). From these figures it is clear that, in terms of growth 
alone, the Mondragon system of cooperatives is an established success 
(Bradley and Gelb, 1981: 213). Even the critics must admit as much. 
The question becomes whether or not it has stuck to its ideals while 
becoming an economic success. 
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Social Organization 
Looking first at the social organization of the cooperatives, the 
goal was to develop a democratically organized and relatively equal 
work-force. In order to enhance this possibility participation in the 
social organization is based on membership, and therefore labor, rather 
than on capital investment (Campbell, 1977: 26). This enables the 
establishment of the one member/one vote principle which is essential 
for avoiding the degeneration of the democratic ideals (Saive, 1980: 
226). This does not mean, however, that all members are strictly equal. 
There is, in fact, a relatively clear hierarchy, but ultimately, at the 
top of the "pyramid" is the general assembly which includes all members, 
drawing attention back to the democratic base (Campbell, 1977: 30). 
Organizational Structure 
The organization of the individual cooperative firm does have a 
clear structure. Bradley and Gelb point out that the actual organiza-
tion of the firm "does not differ too greatly from that of a capitalist 
corporation" (1981: 213). However, the apparent similarities do not 
necessitate similarity of result. The main difference stems from the 
fact that it is the members rather than the share holders who hold ulti-
mate power (Saive, 1980: 226-230). 
The general meeting is the forum for the expression of the collec-
tive will of the cooperators in directing the firm. It is normally held 
annually by the management committee, but in extraordinary circumstances 
can be called at any time by the management committee or one-third of 
the staff of workers. Below the general assembly is the management com-
mittee or Junta Rectora. The members of this committee are elected by 
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all workers at a special general meeting. The committee usually 
inc 1 udes a president, a vice-president, and six other members of the 
firm. They are elected for four years, and every two years at least 
half the seats must be subject to election. This committee has the man-
agerial powers over the firm, much as in a capitalist firm, and is given 
a certain degree of authority which almost appears to include autonomy. 
The general assembly also elects three members to a supervisory board 
whose task it is to monitor, clarify, and verify the financial situation 
of the cooperative and report back to the general assembly. Also 
elected is the president, for not less than four years, whose task it is 
to implement the general management plan which is drawn up by the man-
agement board and submitted to the management committee for approval. 
The management board links the management committee and the president, 
and meets once per month. It also serves as an inter-departmental co-
ordinator, linking the policy-making body and the executive management. 
This, then, is the hierarchical organization of the firm, which does in 
fact look somewhat like the capitalist firm, but the difference is in 
how policy is set, how decisions are made, and where ultimate authority 
rests. 
The Social Council 
In addition to their ultimate authority as members, their determi-
nation of policy, and their selection of management, cooperators also 
have recourse to another form of authority as workers. This is the 
social council. The social council is elected by groups of ten to 
twenty employees who choose one of their members as a representative. 
It meets once a week to facilitate information flow (Saive, 1980: 230). 
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This council is meant as a means for workers to have an additional 
influence on matters of policy and social benefits (Whyte and Blasi, 
1984: 395). The attempt is to provide workers an opportunity for input 
as workers, not as the more general classification of members. As Ana 
Gutierrez-Johnson states, "The social council was conceived as a means 
for the expression of the collective preferences of the members, as 
workers, regarding all terms and conditions of work" (1984: 38). How-
ever, the one strike that has occurred at Mondragon arose, in part, 
because of the lack of real authority to influence management in this 
way. As a result, there have been attempts to increase the institution-
alized power of the social board. For example, the social board now 
"has direct access to both the general manager and the control board to 
whom it can represent the human, as opposed to commercial, requirements 
of the workers" (Campbell, 1977: 25-26). Also, management now consults 
with the social council on all major question, and when a social council 
recommendation is rejected by management, the council has the power to 
call a meeting of the general assembly to overrule management if it so 
chooses (Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 395). In some respects, then, the 
social council acts like a labor union to represent the workers of the 
firm to management. Therefore, the "workers" have control over manage-
ment from both "top" and "bottom." 
Looking at the social organization as a whole, then, it appears 
that in spite of a capitalist-firm-like hierarchy there is clearly a 
principle of democratic input in the organiation. This occurs from tip 
down via the general meeting, and from bottom up via the social council. 
Saive comments on this structure stating, 
making these arrangements the movement demonstrated its ability to 
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establish a number of differentiated levels of decision-making at 
which the individual member can exercise a real influence and thus 
plays an active rather than a passive role. In fact, since deci-
sion-making is conducted in a democratic manner, the system is an 
alternative to that of centraliation (1980: 243). 
The social organization of the firm makes possible the practical 
achievement of ideals of democratic organization without inhibiting the 
capital-growth success of the firm. 
Managers 
At Mondragon there is a continuation of the split betweeen worker 
and manager, with the manager having a certain degree of autonomy in the 
daily affairs of the firm. The main reason for allowing this is respect 
for the managers' expertise and of their necessity in a modern, techni-
cal firm. As Campbell indicates, the social structure works "to ensure 
that the reality of democratic control does not interfere with effective 
management. The control board has the power to hire and fire top man-
agement, but unless prepared to use this final sanction must leave man-
agers to manage" (Campbell, 1977: 31). Gutierrez-Johnson echoes this in 
stating, "The Workers elect the ruling and executive bodies, but once 
elected these have all the authority they need to perform their offices. 
Management is appointed and given jurisdiction over areas of decision 
which cannot be challenged by subordinates; however, it is accountable 
to the collective of members at the end of the term" (1978: 281). So, 
while the managers have a certain degree of autonomy, it is not ulti-
mate, and the strengthening of the social council may further limit any 
possibilities for real autonomy. 
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Size and Technique 
Another factor associated with the social organization of the 
firm, and which may play a role in the success of the firm, is its size. 
To some extnent this fact was made clear after the 1974 strike. It 
became apparent that in order to stay true to democratic ideals they 
simply had to limit firm size. Eaton supports this in stating, "Improv-
ing the quality of working life is closely associated with the question 
of enterprise size" (1978: 482). There seems to be a general consensus 
that firms of about 200 are very workable, while the upper practical 
limit may be about 500 (Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte, 1982: 196). Asso-
ciated with concern the about size--and also growing out of the strike--
-is concern with limiting Tayloristic production techniques, which are 
seen as running counter to the ideals of the cooperatives. A research 
team was sent to Volvo in Sweden to study their production techniques so 
as to adapt them to the Mondragon situation. There is also an effort on 
the part of the research and development cooperative to develop appro-
priate production techniques. But, the changeover is costly and may not 
have progressed in already existing firms as swiftly as the ideals may 
dictate. In new firms, however, both size and techniques are carefully 
considered. 
Discipline 
In order to establish a sense of community and shared interests, 
which includes a certain degree of collective control over members, Mon-
dradon has established a system of discipline. Bradley and Gelb indi-
cate that, "Work discipline is closely regulated by rules internal to 
each cooperative. . Penalties range from written warnings through 
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suspension to losses of income for up to sixty days. Striking against 
the management is punishable by expulsion" (1981: 215). The main reason 
for these relatively harsh penalties is to ensure a relatively "coopera-
tive" work atmosphere. This is indicated in the cooperative statutes, 
which Gutierrez-Johnson reproduces in part: "In order to ensure an ade-
quate organizational climate, both social- and work-related, some 
infractions of the cooperative regulations will be subjected to sanc-
tions" (1980: 286). Infractions range from mild (such as excessive 
lateness or absenteeism, lack of regard for politeness, cleanliness) to 
very serious (including fraud, theft, damage to materials, strikes, 
etc.). These sanctions, then, are a means of maintaining the II cooper a-
tive spirit." It is of course possible that these could be taken too 
far, in which case they would contradict ideals, but the intention is to 
form a degree of solidarity and stability. 
Self-Criticism 
The final issue I want to address in the area of social control is 
the relative flexibility and openness to change rooted in the self-crit-
icism provided by the cooperators in the firm. While this was made 
clear after the strike, there is a clear history of such analysis in the 
cooperatives going back to Arizmendi himself. This ablity must be con-
sidered an asset to the cooperative form at Mondragon. As Jose Maria 
Oramchea, the general manager of the bank, indicates, "'If one has to 
change, well then one changes. change • I 1s necessary. The Mondragon 
cooperators have clearly opted to make history" (Clamp, 1983: 11). 
Campbell indicates that this process of reanalysis does not stop: "The 
process of self-criticism and adaptation is continuous with the single 
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overriding aim of matching their structures, to the needs of individual 
' 
human beings and the community" (1977: 25). As long as decisions are 
made for changing the organization based ultimately on the needs of 
labor rather than capital, it seems likely that the democratic ideals 
/' 
will continue to be represented in the social organization of the struc-
ture. 
Economic Organization 
The second area which must be analyzed is the the economic struc-
ture of the organization. Perhaps it is best here to start with becom-
ing a member of a cooperative. There are two wys . To get into an 
existing cooperative, a worker has to contribute about 250,000 pesatas 
in 1980. This can be obtained by having the money taken out of the 
worker's share of the surplus for the first year if he or she cannot 
otherwise come up with the money. Of this money, 25% is paid into the 
cooperative's reserves and is not reimbursable, while the remainder is 
credited to the worker's capital account. The other way to get in to a 
cooperative is to start a new one. This involves developing a detailed 
plan between the group desiring to start the cooperative and the Caja 
Laboral Popular (CLP), "the people's bank." The workers must contrib-
ute 20% of initial capital, while the government of Spain contributes 
20% as a part of industrial expansion policy. The remaining 60% comes 
from the CLP which, as a cooperative, has a large stake in the firm's 
success. 
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Capital Accounts 
The economic structure varies little from firm to firm due to the 
Contract of Association. All firms must agree to this contract to 
become part of the cooperative system and share in the CLP. As such, a 
number of common features cam be identified. First, all workers are 
given a share of the profit based primarily on two factors: the number 
of hours worked, and their rating on the "labor index." Saive explains, 
"This rating depends on the qualifications and experiences of the worker 
conserned, the level of responsiblity assigned to him, and his attitude 
toward his work. Other factors, such as seniority in the enterprise, 
overtime worked, arduous or unpleasant elememts in his job, are also 
taken into account" (1980: 231-232). Once the surplus is calculated for 
the worker, it is credited to the workers' individual capital account in 
the CLP. An annual interest rate is paid on this capital (6%--incash 
when possible), so the cooperative views the capital, which it retains 
in the bank, as a debt owed to the worker (Gutierrez-Johnson, 1978: 
277). 
However, not all the surplus goes to the credit of workers' capi-
tal accounts. In fact, of the surplus, approximately 70% goes to the 
members in the proportions described above. The remaining 30% is split 
into two parts varying in proportion based on earnings of the firm. 
Thus, approximately 15% of the total surplus goes into a capital reserve 
maintained in the part of the firm as working capital, and the remaining 
15% goes into a social works fund which is used to support education, 
recreational facilities, and health facilities in the cooperative's com-
munity (Eaton, 1979: 34). This means that the firm is able to retain in 
bank accounts approximately 85% of the surplus for reinvestment pur-
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poses, as limitations are placed on the workers' ability to withdraw his 
capital from the bank. Reasons for leaving determine the percentage of 
capital the exiting worker can withdraw. If the reason is retirement, 
he or she is entitled to 100%. However, if the reason is to join a cap-
italist firm for better pay, for example, he or she may only receive 80% 
(Saive, 1980:233). 
Wages 
As a subset of the capital account accumulation there is also the 
issue of wages. In Mondragon there formally is no such thing. Monthly 
pay checks are referred to as "anticipos." This is to be thought of as 
an advance on future shares of profits rather than strictly as wages 
(Campbell, 1977: 26). Neither the surplus capital share nor the antic-
ipo rate, which are calculated by the same "alpha coefficient," are 
allowed to exceed a top-to-bottom ratio of three-to-one. This means pay 
and benefit of top management of top management are not to exceed three 
times that of the lowest worker. This is in keeping with the ideals of 
relative equality. Further, the lowest rate is established to be the 
average wage of the capitalist firms in the vicinity of the cooperative 
(Campbell, 1977: 26). This is an attempt to keep the cooperatives com-
petive for the workers. While maintaining this ratio has been diffi-
cult, particularly for doctors, it does provide a certain commitment to 
the ideals of the firm, even if this may mean some sacrifice on the part 
of managers In spite of this, however, there has recently been some 
pressure to raise the differential to five to one (Clamp, 1983: 11). 
This proposal is thought necessary due to the hiring of top management, 
who already have been able to obtain benefits to make the actual ratio 
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4.5 to 1. It is difficult to foresee exactly what effect this will have 
on maintaining the ideals of the firms. 
Unemployment 
Another issue in the economic organization of the firm which must 
be addressed is unemployment. If a worker is laid off, he or she is 
entitled to 80% of his or her anticipos; this is financed by the social 
works funds (25%), the reserve fund (25%), and by the working members 
(50%). Because of this high cost of unemployment for the firm, two 
solutions are sought. The first is careful planning so as not to hire 
too many workers. As Gutierrez-Johnson states, the need to support laid 
off workers "translates into a policy of not accepting any more workers 
than necessary, since unwanted unemployment or underemployment of the 
members is very costly to the firm" ((1978: 281). The other solution is 
retraining the worker who has become "redundant": "When demand for com-
pany products slackens, workers, instead of being laid off, may retain 
their pay while studying, thus encouraging worker self-improvement and 
also worker commitment to the firm" (Whyte and Blasi, 1984: 394). A 
further policy to limit the expense of unemployment is the hiring of 
persons from other cooperatives who have been laid off. This is in 
keeping with the increasing associative or federalist character of the 
cooperative system in the 1980's. Unemployment, then, is an economic 
problem which is not ignored, and again the attempt to maintain a sense 
of fairness and equality is put forth. This problem could have been 
particularly damaging in the recession of the late 1970' s, but due to 
these principles the cooperatives were able not only to maintain member-
ship, but to grow. 
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Capital Intensity 
A final issue in the economic sphere which needs to be addressed 
is the level of capital-intensity of these firms. For the most part, 
the cooperatives are, at best, medium capital intensive firms (Thomas 
and Logan, 1982: 125). This may be the highest level of intensity that 
these firms may be able to reach given their organizational limitations. 
Campbell supports this, indicating that the form of funding " may rule 
out the most capital-intensive methods of manufacturing (1977: 44). The 
issue here is the ability to maintain sufficient capital reserves per 
worker versus the amount of money needed to enter into and maintain 
operation in capital intensive industry. This may limit the kinds of 
industry that cooperatives may operatie in, as concern is with maximiza-
tion of labor rather than capital. 
Conclusion 
The issues of economic organization, like social organization, 
attempt in a real setting to implement the ideals of relative equality. 
This is operated through the distribution of the surplus to cooperative 
members as workers (i.e. labor), rather than as capital. The three-to-
one ratio is used to limit the degree of difference from top to bottom. 
This ratio is utilized in both wage rates and capital accumulation 
accounts. The money that is paid to these accounts is retained in the 
bank, by the firms, in the worker's name so as to be available for work-
ing capital and reinvestment. The bank, then, becomes a significant 
institution because its structure helps maintain the capital needs of 
the firm. I turn now to this and other supporting institutions. 
51 
Au xi I iary Support Institutions 
The need for supporting institutions became clear early on in the 
Mondragon cooperative venture. The framework for both the educational 
and banking firms were established almost at the very beginning. These 
types of supporting cooperatives are known as secondary cooperatives 
because they include members beyond just their own workers. As Campbell 
states, "The term second degree cooperatives is used to indicate that 
the operation is not solely governed by the workforce. The bank, for 
instance, has two classes of members, the institutional members (the 
associated cooperative enterprises) and individual members (those who 
work for it)" (1977: 34). This situation gives these organizations a 
slightly different structure and dynamic. 
Caja Laboral Popular 
As indicated earlier, the Caja Laboral Popular (CLP) was offi-
cially opened in 1960 to meet the capital and managerial needs of the 
cooperative firms. The source of the banks assets is the capital 
accounts of the workers, as well as the reserve funds of the firms. 
This idea of distributing "each member's shares in profits or surplus to 
the accounts members held in the firm, rather than paying out these 
shares in cash" is traceable back to Arizmendi, and has proven signifi-
cant in avoiding the "inevitable problem of under-capitalization" (Guti-
errez-Johnson and Whyte, 1982: 180). However, the bank does more than 
just provide and save capital; it also provides new cooperatives (in 
particular) with expert management advice. 
In terms of organization, it is set up as are the other organiza-
tions with the main difference being the inclusion in the general assem-
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bly of representatives from all the cooperatives in the system. As in 
other cooperatives, the main every-day-type dceisions are made by the 
management council. It differs from other cooperatives in its role as 
the center of association of all cooperatives. The primary tie in this 
association is the Contract of Association, to which the bank requires 
all cooperative to agree. This contract not only mandates the organiza-
tion and implementation of principles according to its ideals, but also 
stipulates that the bank will have a certain degree of power over the 
cooperative (Saive, 1980: 235-236). This power is manifested in the 
management part of the bank (the "empresarial" division), which dictates 
the steps that must be followed in establishing a new cooperative, and 
which carefully monitors income data once production begins so as to 
meet projected goals. The bank, then, maintains a relatively high 
degree of financial power over the firm, especially for the first two 
years. This system is used in part because the bank contributes 60% to 
the creation of the firm, and in part because they cannot afford the 
overhead which failure would consume; thus, planning is very carefully 
undertaken (Eaton, 1979: 33). The bank is central to the success of the 
cooperative system as a whole due its positioning in capital provision 
and planning, and it is difficult to see the cooperatives succeeding 
without it. 
Other Second Degree Cooperatives 
In addition to the bank, there are also other secondary coopera-
tive support institutions. In education, there is a cooperative, Ale-
coop, which provides education at various levels. It is associated with 
a foundry so that students can work to pay fees and expenses for five 
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hours per day and then "go to school" for another five hours. However, 
it is not fully self-supporting as finances also come through member 
enterprises and entry fees. It is here that workers come to be trained 
and retrained in times of production change or when unemployment occurs. 
and they are laid off. The research and development cooperative works 
to provide or find appropriate appropriate production techniques for the 
cooperatives. As Campbell indicates, it seeks "to develop its own tech-
nologies and methods of production suited to their preferred organiza-
tional structure in small, interdependent cooperatives" (1977: 35). 
The social security cooperative, Lagun-Aro, "provides family allowances, 
medical insurance, sickness benefits, Matrimonial endowments, invalid 
benefits, and pensions for widows, orphans, or natural retirement" 
(Campbell, 1977: 36). The percentage of total anticipos that this 
takes from each worker is quite high, ranging from 20% to 30% (Gutier-
rez-Johnson, 1978: 273). Provision of this service is essential to the 
workers, as they are not eligible for national social security benefits 
because they are classified as self-employed. When a worker retires, 
then, he gets both his capital reserve account and his social seurity 
pension. In combination these form quite a significant amount. 
These are the primary second degree cooperaitves. They provide an 
absolutely essential support network for the cooperatives, as the coop-
erative structure cuts itself off from traditional support systems. As 
Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte state, "The integration of mutual support 
organizations . has clearly been important to the success of the 
Mondragon firsm" (1982: 195). While the bank is singularly the most 
important of these, clearly the importance of the others should not be 
over-looked. 
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Critique 
The system of cooperatives at Mondragon seems to have answered the 
needs in the three areas essential for workplace democracy, and it has 
stayed true to its ideals. The organization established to respond to 
the two main problems faced by cooperatives, under-capitalization and 
degeneration, has been sufficient to meet undreamed of success. How-
ever, Mondragon is not without its problems. Jack Eaton (1979) provides 
a harsh criticism regarding the division between management and worker. 
He argues that the management council wields too much power, and that 
the social council is impotent to counter its power. He further argues 
that the workers may need to establish a union to assert any amount of 
control in the cooperative. This conclusion is somewhat surprising 
given the common assessment of Mondragon as relatively successful in 
meeting its ideals. Perhaps the most significant response to such crit-
icism is to look at worker satisfaction in the cooperative versus the 
capitalist firm. Bradley and Gelb (1981) have done this and not sur-
prisingly have found a much higher level of satisfaction with, as well 
as trust in, management on the part of cooperative workers. Eaton's 
response is "self-exploitation" (1979: 35). While Eaton's criticisms 
deserve attention, and clearly there is a possibility of a severe split 
between management and labor, it would be a mistake to throw the baby 
out with the bathwater. The cooperatives have shown an ability to 
change organizational structure to improve progress toward their ideals 
rather than away from them. Such response has been demonstrated in the 
response to the problems of Taylorism and size. These are issues which 
threatened not only the ideals of the firms, but their very existence as 
well, and the response, while by no means comlete or finshed have been 
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in the interest of labor rather than capital. Another, problem that the 
cooperatives have and will face is bureaucratization. Again, signifi-
cant steps have been made to limit the effect of this problem by limit-
ing size, increasing associative relations, and finally the system of 
monitoring (Thomas and Logan, 1982: 181). This does not mean that Mon-
dragon is an "ultimate good"; it still has the problems listed above, 
even though it is dealing with them. Its apparent willingness to face 
such practical problems from the perspective of an ideal is perhaps the 
most attractive feature of the Mondragon system. Of course, its system 
of organization makes it work, but without acknowledging problems, it 
would have failed long ago. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
These two examples of worker ownership and control serve as exam-
ples of what may or may not be necessary for success. Various aspects 
of each attempt can be compared to see how it is that one is a failure 
and the other a success. In keeping with the theoretical framework, 
such a comparison will best be understood in terms of social, economic, 
and auxiliary institution organization. 
In the area of social organization, it is clear that the Mondragon 
cooperators were able to maintain the ideals of equality far better than 
the Molders. The cooperators at Mondragon seem to have seen the neces-
sity of institutionalizing their ideals into the organizational struc-
ture, whereas the Molders seem to have relied on the honesty and integ-
rity of the workman's ethic. The result was that the Mondragon 
cooperators were able to make changes in their structure as necessary so 
as to maintain a relative equality, while the Molders simply fragmented. 
Why this happened deserves attention. One of the reasons of the adher-
ence, or its lack, to the one member/one vote rule. It is clear that 
the Molders hired outside, non-member workers in direct contradiction to 
the citizenship ideals. This is contrasted to Mondragon where all 
employees are members, with the possible exception of a small number of 
hired executives. This means that not all the Molders shared the same 
rights, and, therefore, not the same access to power within the organi-
zation. This may have been instrumental in the Molders' cooperatives 
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degenerating into joint-stock corporations, as those with power already 
had a strong sense of being capitalists. 
Another reason for the success of Mondragon and the failure of the 
Molders in terms of social organization is, ironically, the acceptance 
at Mondragon of hierarchical organization, as well as the acceptance of 
the skill-knowledge of managers. Among the Molders, skill-knowledge was 
general and a molder had knowledge of and control over the whole produc-
tion process. The "integrity" of their labor had not yet been broken 
down by mechanization or scientific management. In spite of this, how-
ever, they were unable to maintain cohesion among themselves, and 
rejected the role of the manager altogether as unnecessary. This is 
contrasted with Mondragon, where the hierarchy was accepted as a kind of 
necessary evil so as to compete in the capitalist marketplace, and man-
agers were seen as a part of this process. Perhaps this shows that a 
holistic skill-knowledge is no guarantee of success, just as hierarchy 
is no guarantee of failure. To the Mondragon cooperator's credit, they 
realized that relative equality and the limiting of differentials is a 
more realistic approach than the imposition of total equality throughout 
the workplace. While these differentials have been a source of strain 
for Mondragon, as one would expect given their ideals, these cooperators 
were able to change the organization to bring it more in line with these 
ideals. 
The levels at which the workers have power in the organization. 
is another important aspect of social organization. Again, where the 
Molders failed in institutionalizing their ideals, the Mondragon cooper-
ators were successful. At Mondragon the workers have authority at the 
top of the organization by virtue of their membership in the General 
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Assembly. They also have authority from the bottom as workers through 
the Social Council. In this way there is a double accounting to the 
interests of labor within the organization. This is contrasted to the 
Molders who seem again to have relied simply upon their workman's ethic. 
Thus, the institutionalization of the interests of labor seems essential 
to the success of worker ownership and control. 
Another feature of the social organization in which the Molders 
failed an Mondragon was successful is the establishment of specific 
rules and principles of conduct within the organization. These coopera-
tors have a clear set of guidelines which the members must follow or be 
subject to clearly specified disciplinary procedures. This provides a 
certain degree of unity and coherence within the organization. The 
Molders, on the other hand, again seem to have relied less on specified 
principles than on their workman's ethic. This lack of specificity may 
have allowed for a variety of interpretations, as well as outright vio-
lations. It is clear, for instance, that the Molder's cooperatives vio-
lated this ethic by producing above what the ethic dictated and by 
undercutting the prices of the molders working in capitalist firms. The 
clarity of social organization principles may, then, be essential to 
worker ownership and control as it provides a certain degree of stabil-
ity and cohesion within the organization. 
Based on the examples of the Molders and the Mondragon cooperators 
in the area of social organization, what seems most important is the 
institutionalization of the ideals of equality. This includes the one 
member/one vote rule for all who work in the firm, the establishment of 
the authority of labor from both top and bottom, and the development of 
clear and concise principles of organization and action, including dis-
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ciplinary measures. Without such organization, it appears that degener-
at ion will occur. The Molders relied upon the workman's ethic, and 
seemingly the goodness of mankind/labor, which was not sufficient. 
This notion of the institutionalization of principles applies also 
to economic organization. One of the biggest problems that worker owned 
and controlled firms face is under-capitalization. As such, the firm 
must be organized in such a way as to increase the availibility of work-
ing capital. Here the analysis of how the surlpus is distributed is 
important. Both the Molders and the Mondragon cooperators saw the need 
for a reserve working-capital fund, and both split the surplus in simi-
lar ways. In the beginning, at least, the Molders paid out 80% of the 
surplus to labor, as interest on labor, compared to 70% at Mondragon. 
The Molders paid out approximately 5% of the surplus to a reserve fund 
for working capital, while at Mondragon 15% was paid out for this pur-
pose. The remaining percentages were paid out differently. Where the 
Mondragon cooperators paid about 15% to a social works fund for the bet-
terment of the community, the Molders paid out its remaining 15% out as 
interest on capital based on the number of shares held in the firm. 
This was done to increase the likelihood of buying shares in the firms, 
making its establishment possible by increasing capital. 
In looking at this distribution of the surplus, attention must be 
paid to how labor's share is paid-out Mondragon established a system of 
individual capital accounts to which labors share is paid, but which is 
retained in th bank for each individual worker on the part of the firm. 
This can then be used as working capital by the firm, bringing to about 
85% of the surplus that the firm has access to in case of need. In con-
trast, the Molders paid out labors share directly to the workers in 
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cash, and thus lost the ability to utilize this portion of the surplus. 
Given the basic under-capitalization of these firms, it seems essential 
to use the capital account approach developed by the Mondragon coopera-
tors. 
Another aspect of economic organization that this distribution of 
the surplus hints at is the problem of basic ownership. The fact that 
15% of the Molders' surplus is paid out as interest on capital based on 
stocks owned points to an important difference between this system of 
organization and that at Mondragon. This basic stock ownership on the 
part of the Molders does not exist at Mondragon. At Mondragon there are 
no owners per se, rather, there are members who collectively " " own the 
firm. Benefits are paid only according to membership and skill level, 
never according to ownership. This difference may have been critical in 
allowing for the economic degeneration of the molders' cooperatives into 
a joint-stock corporation. If ownership is based on stocks and not on 
general membership the interests and rights of individual ownership may 
over ride the egalitarian ideals of such firms. 
The differences in the setting of wages must also be noted. The 
Molders utilized their position to undercut prices of capitalist firms, 
and thus accept lower wages, so as to gain a greater share of the market 
and therefore a greater surplus and profit. In contrast, the Mondragon 
cooperators based wages on the average wage of other capitalist firms in 
the area. The result for the Molders was short-term success but even-
tual failure as the capitalist firms had the resources available to 
match the prices and thus bleed the capital-poor cooperatives dry, hurt-
ing both molders inside and outside the cooperatives. The Mondragon 
cooperators were able to remain competitive in the market-place on rela-
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tively equal terms, and did not base success on their ability to limit 
wages and undercut prices. Worker owned and controlled firms must pay 
comparable wages so as to maintain the interests of labor in the long 
run, and not rely on the surplus share to attract labor. While it is 
not clear that Mondragon does so, it may be important to seperate 
entirely wages and surplus shares, so that workers have wages as workers 
and shares as members. This would correspond to the authority they have 
from both top and bottom in the area of social organization. 
A final issue in the area of economic organization is that of cap-
ital intensity. Here it seems that both the Molders and the Mondragon 
cooperators were on the right track. Both occurred in industries of low 
to moderate capital intensity. In fact, the Molders capital failure in 
even a limited capital intensity firm should demonstrate the severity of 
this problem. Without a sufficient amount of capital per worker, based 
on the kind of product, these firms cannot succeed. While they can take 
steps to address the problem of limited capital, such as individual cap-
ital accounts, it may be that these kind of firms simply cannot be 
established, at least in the forms demonstrated, in certain kinds of 
industries. 
Closely associated with this problem of economic and social organ-
ization is the support provided by auxiliary institutions, especially 
the bank. The Molders failed to establish any such institutions in 
spite of recognizing their possible necessity. This may simply be due 
to the relatively short lifespan of the Molders' cooperatives. At Mon-
dragon, however, a variety of support institutions were developed. Most 
importantly, the bank serves as the holder of the individual capital 
accounts and capital reserve accounts, and thus is an essential feature 
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of the economic success of these firms. The bank also serves as the hub 
of the cooperative network by virtue of its planning division and Con-
tract of Association, which are essential in developing the social 
organization of these firms. Together these second degree cooperatives 
provide an environment which is suppportive of the cooperative structure 
both socially and economically. Without this support structure, it 
seems unlikely that such firms ould succedd given the hostility of the 
environment on the part of capitalist or socialist institutions. 
The three theoretical areas provide a framework for understanding 
worker ownership and control. They demonstrate the importance of set-
ting up and institutionalizing an organization that will implement the 
ideals of these firms. The Molders were unsuccessful in establishing 
such an organization in all three areas, while the Mondragon cooperators 
were successful in each. Part of the reason for this difference, apart 
from lack of clarity throughout on the part of the Molders, is the situ-
ation in which each was established. The Molders' cooperatives were 
established in a time of great crisis, and as such were forced to push 
forward as quickly as possible, resulting in poor managerial decisions. 
At Mondragon, however, the pace was different. The cooperative school 
was established in 1943, the first foundry, Ulgor, in 1956, and the bank 
in 1963. So, it took twenty years for the essential features to be put 
in place. This is compared to the period of months that the Molders 
faced. It may be, then, that attempts at worker ownership and control 
should not bite off more than they can chew. While the Mondragon coop-
erative system has expanded rapidly over the last twenty years, it may 
not have been able to do so without the slow, deliberate progress of the 
first twenty. This situation may limit the possibility of using this 
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kind of organization as a way for workers to maintain firms closed down 
by deindiustrialization. Without the organization and support struc-
ture, these firms simply cannot succeed. This option is not a quick 
fix. Concrete organizational problems must be addressed, and steps must 
be made to institutionalize against both social and economic degenera-
tion. To accomplish this, auxiliary institutions are essential. Fur-
ther, these firms cannot stand pat once the organization is established. 
They must be sensitive to change and have the ability to self-criticize. 
Reflection must be a basic aspect of these firms, as success is measured 
not simply by profit, but by adherence to social and economic ideals. 
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